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I. Introduction 
This year saw a significant number of oil and gas cases in Pennsylvania. 
On the regulatory side, the supreme court rejected an operator’s challenge 
to assessments of impact fees on some unconventional vertical wells 
(Snyder Bros., Inc. v. PUC) and ruled that zoning hearing boards could 
consider evidence from residents of different municipalities as to the oil 
and gas operations of a conditional use applicant (EQT Production Co. v. 
Jefferson Hills). In an important case, the commonwealth court rejected 
constitutional and statutory challenges to a township’s permitting oil and 
gas operations in all districts (Frederick v. Allegheny Township ZHB). In 
another novel case, the commonwealth court held that oil and gas lessees 
could be liable for leasing practices and alleged anticompetitive conduct 
under a consumer protection statute (Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. 
Commonwealth).   
There were also a number of oil and gas lease dispute cases. 
Pennsylvania courts enjoined lessors from interfering with a lessee’s oil 
and gas operations (Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC), held that an 
underground lateral was not “on the premises” for purposes of a free gas 
clause (Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc.), held that lessee’s prior practice of not 
deducting post-production cost deductions did not forbid taking deductions 
in the future (MAWC v. CNX Gas Col., LLC), and refused to dismiss 
lessors’ claims for breach of a pooling and unitization clause in a lease 
(Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.). In a rare Pennsylvania 
royalty title case, the superior court held in a nonprecedential case that a 
deed reservation of royalties and income from oil and gas extended beyond 
the current lease (Julia v. Huntley). 
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II. Judicial Developments 
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Cases 
1. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 
2018), amended on reconsideration, 203 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019).  
$ Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that unconventional 
vertical wells are “vertical gas wells” subject to assessment of 
yearly impact fee if production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet per 
day for at least one month of the year. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the commonwealth court’s 
en banc decision interpreting the assessment of yearly impact fees on 
natural gas wells under Chapter 23 Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act (“Act 
13”). Act 13 imposes impact fees on wells producing from unconventional 
formations. Only wells that produce in amounts greater than that of a 
stripper well trigger fees.1 “Stripper well” is defined by Act 13 as “[a]n 
unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic 
feet of gas per day during any calendar month[.]”2 The court considered the 
use of the word “any” in the definition of stripper well.3 In other words, 
would an impact fee be assessed whenever a vertical well's production 
exceeds an average of 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one 
month of the year, or must the well exceed this production threshold in 
every month of the year, for the fee to be imposed?4 The commonwealth 
court held that the impact fee cannot be imposed on wells where production 
from that well fell below the threshold during any month of the year.5 
Reversing the en banc commonwealth court, the supreme court concluded 
that an impact fee will be assessed on wells if their production exceeds 
90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year.6 
Snyder Brothers drilled a number of unconventional vertical wells in the 
Commonwealth and submitted well production data to the Public Utilities 
Commission (“PUC”) pursuant to Act 13.7 PUC’s Bureau of Investigation 
and Enforcement concluded that Snyder Brothers underreported the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 58 PA. STAT AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2302(a). 
 2. Id. § 2301 (emphasis added). 
 3. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 198 A.3d 1056, 1061 (Pa. 2018), 
amended on reconsideration, 203 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019). 
 4. Id. at 1057. 
 5. Id. at 1058. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1061. 
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number of wells that met the impact fee criteria and filed a complaint 
seeking past impact fees and other costs.8 Snyder Brothers responded that 
certain wells had not been reported because they were exempt from the 
impact fees as stripper wells.9 The Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas 
Association (“PIOGA”) intervened. A PUC administrative law judge 
agreed with the Bureau of Investigation, concluding that a vertical gas well 
producing “more than 90,000 cubic feet per day in any calendar month in a 
calendar year [is] subject to the impact fee.”10 The administrative law judge 
gave “great deference” to the administrative agency to support the Bureau 
of Investigation’s assessment of fees.11 Snyder Brothers and PIOGA 
appealed to the PUC. 
PUC agreed with the administrative law judge, arguing that the 
dispositive issue is “whether or not the well met Section 2301's definition 
of a stripper well, i.e., did not produce more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas 
per day in ‘any calendar month.’”12 The PUC found the term “any” 
ambiguous. PUC “expressed its concern that relieving a producer of having 
to pay an impact fee based on only one month's reduced production would 
create an incentive for ‘unscrupulous producers’ to deliberately reduce 
production at a well during one month of a calendar year to avoid paying 
the fee for the whole year.”13 PUC supported its liberal construction of the 
statute through the government’s desire to collect impact fees. PUC adopted 
the decision of the administrative law judge with slight modifications. 
Snyder Brothers and PIOGA appealed to the commonwealth court.14 
The commonwealth court reversed the PUC en banc.15 The majority 
concluded that the term “any” as used in the definition of stripper well is 
not ambiguous. Therefore, a well that failed to exceed the 90,000 cubic-
foot production threshold in any month of the year was exempt from the 
impact fee. 16 
While the commonwealth court found the plain meaning of the statute 
unambiguous, it analyzed the PUC’s interpretation through its own 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 1060. 
 9. Id. at 1061. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1062. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1063. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm., 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (en 
banc). 
 16. Snyder Bros., 198 A.3d at 1063-64. 
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statutory construction.17 The majority rejected the notion that the desire to 
collect more impact fees for the government “was a legitimate basis for 
liberally construing the statute in the manner employed by the PUC.”18 The 
majority also declined to give deference to PUC’s interpretation embodied 
in its Proposed Rulemaking Orders. Lastly, the majority applied the rule of 
lenity—rather than applying a liberal construction—because the penalties 
imposed under Act 13 for failure to pay impact fees made the statute penal 
in nature.19  
On appeal, the supreme court analyzed the commonwealth court’s 
decision using a de novo standard of review because the issues of statutory 
interpretation are questions of law.20 The majority framed the “pivotal” 
question as “the definition of ‘stripper well,’ as it has been incorporated 
and utilized in the definition of ‘vertical gas well.’”21 The majority found 
that the term “any” can have either of two “divergent” meanings: it could 
mean “all or every” or it could mean “one.”22 The court looked to the 
context of the use of “any” within the “overall statutory framework in 
which it appears” to determine that the term “any” is ambiguous as used in 
the definition of stripper well.23 The court then conducted its own statutory 
interpretation analysis to ultimately agree with the PUC and disagree with 
the commonwealth court.  
The court determined that PUC’s interpretation ensured “stability in the 
impact fee assessment process,” whereas Snyder Brothers’ and PIOGA’s 
interpretation “would lead to an unreasonable result.”24 As a public policy 
consideration, the court stated that appellee’s interpretation “would permit 
well operators who have enjoyed robust production from their wells for the 
majority of a calendar year to avoid paying the impact fees to the 
municipalities merely because of the happenstance of one month's 
diminished production.”25 With these considerations, the court found that 
commonwealth court’s holding impermissibly favored “the private 
financial interests of the producers over the public interest of counties and 
municipalities in having sufficient fiscal capabilities to protect their 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 1064-65. 
 18. Id. at 1065. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1071. 
 21. Id. at 1071-72. 
 22. Id. at 1072. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1079.   
 25. Id. 
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residents from the deleterious effects of unconventional drilling 
activities.”26 The court held that “under Act 13, an unconventional vertical 
well is a ‘vertical gas well’ subject to assessment of an impact fee for a 
calendar year whenever that well's natural gas production exceeds 90,000 
cubic feet per day in at least one calendar month of that year.”27 
2. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 208 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 
2019) 
$ The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that a municipality 
could admit the testimony of non-residents in an evidentiary 
hearing considering land use permit application. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted a petition for allowance of 
appeal to determine whether a municipality could consider testimony from 
nonresidents of the community when considering and oil and gas 
companies condition use permit application for the construction and 
operation of a well site.28  
EQT Production Company applied for a conditional use permit in 2015 
to drill unconventional oil and gas wells in Jefferson Hills, Allegheny 
County.29 There were no existing unconventional wells in Jefferson Hills at 
that time. Jefferson Hill’s zoning code permitted unconventional oil and 
gas well drilling as a conditional use. Upon consideration of EQT’s 
application, the Borough Planning Commission recommended that the 
Borough Council approve the permit application.30  
The Borough Council conducted a public hearing on the application as 
required by the Municipalities Planning Code (“MPC”).31 Eight people 
testified at the hearing in opposition to conditional use application (the 
“Objectors”) including three that did not live in Jefferson Hills, but resided 
in Union Township, Washington County, which is adjacent. Those three 
Objectors, along with a resident who recently moved to Jefferson Hills from 
Union Township, lived near an unconventional well operated by EQT. They 
testified that EQT’s oil and gas activities negatively impacted their health, 
quality of life and the community’s environment.32 The Borough Council 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 208 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2019). 
 29. Id. 1011-12. 
 30. Id. 1012. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 1013. 
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denied the conditional use application after giving “significant weight” to 
the Objectors’ testimony.33  
The Borough Council found that EQT’s application met the general 
standards and specific requirements for the grant of a conditional use 
permit, but concluded that granting the permit for the proposed oil and gas 
well “does not protect the health, safety and welfare of the Borough and its 
residents[.]”34 The Borough Council determined that “pursuant to 
Pennsylvania case law, [EQT] [has] not met [its] burden of proof for a 
conditional use application and the burden never shifted to the objectors to 
prove that the impact of the proposed use is such that it would violate the 
other general requirements for land use set forth in the Borough Zoning 
Ordinance.”35 EQT appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County.  
The court of common pleas reversed the Borough Council because the 
Council had found EQT met the general standards and specific 
requirements of the conditional use. Once EQT met the general standards, 
the burden should have shifted to the Objectors to prove that the use would 
adversely affect the general public.36 The court of common pleas found that 
the Objectors did not meet this burden. The court characterized their 
testimony as “speculative regarding general oil and gas development,” and 
raising only “theoretical concerns about air pollution and odors.”37 The 
Borough appealed to the commonwealth court. 
A panel of the commonwealth court affirmed the court of common 
pleas.38 The panel found that EQT had met its burden of complying with 
the requirements of the zoning ordinance, but the Objectors failed to meet 
their burden of showing a detrimental impact.39 In her dissent, Judge 
Patricia A. McCullough noted that it is difficult for objectors to demonstrate 
that a novel use will have a negative impact on the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community, because they have not, heretofore, had any 
firsthand experience with the particular use.40 Over the dissent, the majority 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 1017. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1017-18. 
 36. Id. at 1018. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 
2017). 
 39. EQT Prod. Co., 208 A.3d at 1019. 
 40. Id. at 1020 (McCullough, J., dissenting). 
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of the panel agreed that the Objectors’ testimony, which was admitted into 
evidence, was too speculative.41  
The Borough filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania.42 The court granted the petition and considered the 
following issue:43 
Whether the Commonwealth Court erred as a matter of law by 
imposing a standard upon the admissibility of objectors' 
evidence that effectively eliminates the ability to raise any 
objection to a land use application based on firsthand experience 
with a similar use when the proposed use does not already appear 
within municipal borders? 
The court reversed the commonwealth court and remanded with 
instructions that the court of common pleas with instructions to consider 
the nonresident Objectors’ testimony. The court stated that its review is one 
of evidentiary admissibility: “whether the testimony of the residents of a 
municipality regarding their firsthand experiences with the manner in 
which a particular land use was conducted by the owner of property in very 
near proximity to their own homes was admissible in a hearing held in 
another municipality on a land use application to conduct a similar land use 
there.”44  
Notably, the court did not find that the commonwealth court reviewed 
the testimony for its sufficiency, but instead characterized the 
commonwealth court’s finding that the testimony was speculative as 
“dismissive.”45 The court stated that the dismissive nature in which the 
commonwealth court handled the nonresident testimony “gives credence to 
the Borough's concern that the panel decision in this matter will be 
interpreted as a categorical bar to the admissibility of this type of firsthand 
experiential evidence in future conditional use hearings.”46 With this 
foundation, the court explained that the nonresident testimony at issue 
should have been admitted.  
The court noted that local agencies are not bound by the technical rules 
of evidence when conducting hearings, but may consider “all relevant 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1025. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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evidence of reasonably probative value.”47 The court found that local 
agencies need that flexibility in conditional use hearings because they are 
considering that evidence under their duty to protect residents from harm.48 
Under that broad evidentiary standard, and in fulfilling their duty to protect, 
the court concluded that the testimony of the nonresident Objectors was 
relevant and reasonably probative of the affects EQT’s proposed 
conditional use could have on Jefferson Hills.49  
The court relied on its 1990 decision in Visionquest National, LTD v. 
Board of Supervisors of Honey Brook Township, which affirmed the denial 
of a conditional use application based in part on the testimony of 
neighboring residents.50 There, the operators of a youth rehabilitation 
facility sought a conditional use permit that had been operating in the 
community without a permit.51 The operator fulfilled the criteria for 
conditional use.52 Residents of the community testified as to effects of the 
presently operating facility on their daily lives. This included fears of 
escapes. Escapes had occurred, but no physical damage had resulted in the 
community.53 Additionally, residents from a neighboring community that 
had a facility run by the same operator testified that escapes had caused 
physical damage in that community. The local governing body denied the 
application based in part on the fears articulated by the residents and 
nonresidents. The trial court upheld the denial, but the commonwealth court 
reversed, finding that the “possibility of an adverse impact, based on 
unsupported anxieties, was insufficient to meet the appellant's burden of 
proof.”54 The court reversed, rejecting the commonwealth court’s finding 
that the evidence was too speculative “because the residents’ testimony was 
based on their own firsthand experiences with the operation of the facility.55 
Even though the evidence in Visionquest was related to a facility in the 
community and based upon testimony of the community’s residents, the 
court found the rationale controlling in the present matter.56 “[The] 
firsthand experiences with a particular type of land use by people living 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. (citing 2 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 554 (West 2019)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1026. 
 50. 569 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990). 
 51. Id. at 916. 
 52. Id. at 917. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. EQT Prod. Co., 208 A.3d at 1026. 
 56. Id. at 1026-27. 
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near it are relevant and probative evidence for a local government to 
consider in evaluating whether a similar land use activity conducted by the 
same entity, in a similar manner, and in a similar type of location” is 
relevant and reasonably probative of the impact on the community.57  
Justice Sallie Mundy dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s finding 
that “anecdotal evidence by lay witnesses regarding operations in a 
different municipality can serve as a basis for denying a conditional use to 
a landowner who has satisfied the objective criteria of the zoning 
ordinance.”58 Justice Mundy would have relied upon precedent that shifted 
the burden to prove an adverse effect on the community to the Objectors 
once EQT met the permitting requirements. Because EQT had met those 
requirements, Objectors should have been required to provide sufficient 
evidence to establish that there is a high degree of probability that the use 
will cause substantial harm to the community.”59 Generalized grievances 
do not meet that burden.  
The long-term effect of the court’s decision may not be significant. This 
opinion held that the evidence is admissible. Here, each tribunal admitted 
the evidence of the Objectors, but gave it little weight because of its 
speculative nature. As such, the court confirmed the admissibility of non-
resident testimony as to harm, but the local agencies and lower courts must 
still weigh that evidence against an applicant’s entitlement to a conditional 
use permit when it satisfies the specific, objective criteria in the zoning 
ordinance for that conditional use. 
B. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Cases 
1. Frederick v. Allegheny Tp. Zoning Hrg. Bd., 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. October 26, 2018), pet. for allowance of appeal denied, 
449 WAL 2018 (Pa. May 14, 2019)  
$ The commonwealth court held that zoning ordinance did not 
violate substantive due process, Pennsylvania’s Environmental 
Rights Amendment, or the Municipalities Planning Code simply 
because it allowed oil and gas development as a permitted use in 
all zoning districts where the ordinance required the applicant to 
satisfy numerous health, safety and public welfare standards.  
The commonwealth court reviewed a substantive validity challenge to a 
local zoning ordinance (“Ordinance”) in Frederick v. Allegheny Township 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 1027. 
 58. Id. at 1031 (Mundy, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. 1029 (citing In re Cutler Group, 880 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)). 
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Zoning Hearing Board that also considered the applicability of 
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment to zoning.60 Three 
residents (“Objectors”) challenged the Ordinance in question, which 
allowed oil and gas development as a permitted use in all zoning districts, 
but subject to certain health, safety and public welfare requirements.61 The 
Objectors argued that the Ordinance constituted illegal spot zoning in 
violation of substantive due process, violated the Environmental Rights 
Amendment (“ERA”) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and violated 
several provisions of Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code 
(“MPC”).62 The court rejected the challenge en banc, finding that the 
municipality acted within state law in determining where oil and gas 
development may occur.63  
The Allegheny Township Board of Supervisors passed an amendment to 
an existing zoning ordinance in 2010 that allowed oil and gas operations in 
all zoning districts as a permitted use “by right.” The Ordinance subjected 
the application to numerous standards and conditions designed to protect 
the public.64  
CNX Gas Company, LLC submitted a zoning permit application to 
construct an unconventional well pad in an R-2 (Agricultural/Residential) 
Zoning District. The application complied with the requirements of the 
Ordinance. The Township issued the permit.65 The Objectors appealed the 
permit to the Allegheny Township Zoning Hearing Board (“Board”).66 The 
Objectors argued the Ordinance allowed an “industrial use” in a 
residential/agricultural zoning district in contravention of ERA and in 
violation of Objectors’ substantive due process rights. The Objectors cited 
the supreme court’s 2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth 
(hereinafter Robinson II) in support of their argument.67 
After holding evidentiary hearings, the Board issued a written decision 
containing detailed findings of fact.68 The Board found that the experts and 
the evidence submitted by the Objectors was not credible, but found that 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 26, 2018). 
 61. Id. at 679. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 701-02. 
 64. Id. at 680. 
 65. Id. at 679. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (hereinafter Robinson II). 
 68. Frederick, 196 A.3d at 683-84. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
256 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
the expert and evidence submitted by the permittee was.69 The Board 
disagreed with the Objectors’ contentions that the land use would have an 
adverse effect on public health, safety and welfare. Instead, the Board found 
that the Ordinance promoted the public health, safety, and welfare of the 
Township.70 Likewise, the Board did not find that land use would have an 
adverse effect on the environment. The Board upheld the validity of the 
Ordinance and rejected the Objectors’ reliance on Robinson II.71 The 
Objectors appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland 
County. The court of common pleas affirmed and the Objectors appealed 
to the commonwealth court.72  
The commonwealth court affirmed the Board by a 5–2 majority and 
issued an en banc opinion. The majority addressed the Objectors’ three 
arguments: (1) whether the Township's zoning ordinance violates 
substantive due process by instituting illegal spot zoning; (2) whether CNX 
Gas Company's permit to develop an unconventional gas well in the R-2 
Zoning District violates the ERA; and (3) whether permitting oil and gas 
development in every zoning district violates the MPC.73  
First, the court held that the Ordinance did not violate substantive due 
process. The court noted that the Objectors stated concerns about oil and 
gas development outside of industrial zoning districts, but did not support 
their concerns with credible evidence, but only with speculation.74 The 
court looked to its recent decisions and explained that objections to well 
pad construction activities must be based on more than mere speculation of 
a possible harm to carry an objector’s burden of proof.75 The court 
distinguished oil and gas development from heavy industry that is often 
relegated to “industrial” zoning districts.  
Next, the majority determined that the Ordinance did not violate the 
ERA, which states in relevant part, “[t]he people have a right to clean air, 
pure water, and to preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic 
values of the environment.”76 Notably, the court concluded that the 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 685. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 686. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 687. 
 75. Id. at 689-90 (citing Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors, 123 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2015), rev’d on other grounds, 186 A.3d 375; EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 
162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) pet. for allowance of appeal granted in part, 179 A.3d 
545 (Pa. 2018)). 
 76. Art. I, § 27 PA. CONST. 
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Township could not “replicate the environmental oversight that the General 
Assembly has conferred upon [Department of Environmental Protection] 
and other state agencies.”77 The Objectors argued that the Township was 
required by Robinson II to complete an environmental impact analysis prior 
to passing the 2010 amendments to the Ordinance.78 Furthermore, the 
Objectors argued that the permitted use would harm the local 
environment.79  
The court looked to Robinson II and the recent decision in Pennsylvania 
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, to state that the 
applicable standard should be whether or not the governmental action 
“unreasonably impairs those values” provided in the ERA.80 Noting that 
“[i]t is axiomatic that a zoning ordinance must balance the public interests 
of the community with the due process rights of private property owners,” 
the court highlighted that the Township could not act “beyond the bounds 
of [its] enabling legislation.”81 Therefore, the Township is precluded from 
replicating the environmental oversight afforded to the Department of 
Environmental Protection.82  
Considering these restraints on the Township’s role, but also applying 
the Board’s factual findings, the court concluded that “Objectors did not 
prove [the Ordinance] is a law that unreasonably impairs their rights under 
the [ERA].”83 In sum, Objectors did not prove that [the Ordinance] does not 
reasonably account for the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the Township's environment.” 
Finally, the majority concluded that the Ordinance did not violate the 
MPC by allowing oil and gas development “contrary to the state of 
community objectives set forth in [the ordinance],” places “water sources 
and other environmental assets at risk,” and allows incompatible uses to 
take place within the R-2 Zoning District.”84 The court found these 
arguments analogous to those advanced in the substantive due process 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 697. 
 78. Frederick, 196 A.3d at 691. 
 79. Id. at 693. 
 80. Id. at 694 (citing Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) 
(PEDF). 
 81. Id. at 695. 
 82. Id. at 696. 
 83. Id. at 697. 
 84. Id. at 699. 
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claim. As such, the court repeated its conclusion that the Objectors failed 
to support their claim with credible evidence.85  
The majority drafted a conclusion concisely explaining its rejection of 
the Objectors’ claims and its affirmance of the Board.86 The conclusion 
contained the following short paragraph noting an inconsistency in the 
present appeal:87 
Objectors’ objectives in this litigation are confounding. Were 
they to succeed in invalidating Zoning Ordinance 01-2010, then 
they release oil and gas operators from the ordinance conditions 
that relate to noise, lighting, hours, security and dust. Absent 
Zoning Ordinance 01-2010, CNX's permit could be invalidated. 
However, CNX would no longer need a “zoning compliance 
permit” to operate the Porter Pad. 
In their dissenting opinions, Judge McCullough and Judge Ceisler voiced 
concerns over the majority’s application of the ERA. Judge McCullough 
would have remanded back to the Board to take additional evidence to 
determine whether the Ordinance is compatible with the ERA.88 Judge 
McCullough would remand in light of PEDF, but also noted that “the 
Township ventured into uncharted, choppy waters when it enacted the 
Ordinance” allowing oil and gas development in all zoning districts.89 
Notably, Judge McCullough wrote that the Ordinance “should be subjected 
to strict scrutiny and analysis in the same manner that courts provide to 
other fundamental rights.”90 Judge Ceisler agreed with much of the 
majority’s reasoning but dissented because she “took issue with its 
conclusion that [the Ordinance] does not violate the [ERA].”91 Judge 
Ceisler would hold that the Ordinance “clearly, palpably, and plainly 
violated the [ERA].”92  
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear further appeal on 
the matter. As such, the commonwealth court decision provides guidance 
on the application of the ERA to zoning. 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 700. 
 86. See id. at 700-02. 
 87. Id. at 701. 
 88. Id. at 702. 
 89. Id. at 703. 
 90. Id. at 707. 
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2. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. March 15, 2019) 
$ The commonwealth court concluded that (i) a lessee under an oil 
and gas lease may be liable under the Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law and (ii) the Attorney General can 
maintain anti-trust claims under the UTPCPL.  
On interlocutory appeal, the majority of an en banc panel of the 
commonwealth court decided that the Office of Attorney General could 
bring antitrust claims against oil and gas lessees under the Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).93 First, the 
commonwealth court considered whether the Attorney General could bring 
a cause of action against lessees pursuant to the UTPCPL for allegedly 
wrongful conduct perpetrated by lessees in the context of leasing 
subsurface mineral rights from private landowners.94 Second, the court 
determined whether the Attorney General can bring a cause of action 
against those lessees pursuant to the UTPCPL for alleged antitrust 
violations.95 The court of common Pleas of Bradford County concluded that 
the Attorney General could bring both types of claims, and overruled 
Appellants’ preliminary objections to the claims.  
On appeal, the commonwealth court reviewed whether oil and gas 
leasing could trigger actionable claims under the UTPCPL. The General 
Assembly declared unlawful 21 separate categories of unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade 
or commerce under the UTPCPL along with other acts designated by the 
Attorney General through the administrative rulemaking process.96 The 
commonwealth court had to first consider whether oil and gas leasing is 
“trade or commerce” under the UTPCPL.  
The UTPCPL defines “trade and commerce as the advertising, offering 
for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible, real, 
personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value 
wherever situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly 
affecting the people of this Commonwealth.”97 The definition applies to the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). 
 94. Id. at 53. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 55 (citing 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-3, 201-2(4), 201-3.1) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 97. Id. (citing 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(3)) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
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sale of things of value, but not expressly to the purchasing of a thing or to 
the leasing of a thing. Under this definition, Appellants argued that the 
UTPCPL is designed to protect consumers against underhanded behavior 
of sellers, rather than all parties to a given transaction.98 The court 
disagreed, finding that Appellants’ leasing of Appellee’s mineral interest 
constitutes “trade and commerce” as those terms are “understood in the 
context of the Law.”99 The court cited a case that considered residential 
property leasing to be within the definition of “trade and commerce” in 
support of its finding.100   
Finding that oil and gas leasing fit within “trade and commerce,” the 
court then found that the Attorney General stated a legally viable claim 
against the Appellants based on allegedly unfair conduct in obtaining the 
oil and gas leases. The commonwealth court held that the trial court 
properly overruled Appellants’ preliminary objections that their behavior 
in securing the oil and gas leases was not actionable under the UTPCPL. 
Next, the court considered whether the Attorney General’s “antitrust” 
claims were actionable under the UTPCPL. The complaint contained two 
separate counts alleging antitrust violations. The first count alleged that 
Appellants’ joint venture and market sharing agreements intrinsically 
violated the UTPCPL. The second alleged that Appellants “deceived and 
acted unfairly towards private landowners by giving them misleading 
information, and/or failing to disclose information, regarding the open 
market’s true appetite for subsurface mineral rights leases, as well as 
whether terms of the agreed-to leases were competitive and fair.”101 
Appellants noted that the UTPCPL does not expressly disallow joint 
venture agreements, as the Appellants had entered into. Moreover, 
Appellants cited to the General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass an 
antitrust law. As such, Appellants argued that the Attorney General could 
not use the UTPCPL to bring antitrust claims.102 
The court agreed with Appellants’ on the first count: the mere existence 
of a joint venture does not create “impairment of choice and the competitive 
process” to sufficiently state a claim within the 21 enumerated violations 
under the UTPCPL.103 The commonwealth court reversed the trial court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Monument Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 820-26 (Pa. 
1974)). 
 101. Id. at 61. 
 102. Id. at 59-60.  
 103. Id. at 60. 
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overruling of Appellants’ preliminary objection to the count alleging the 
Appellants’ joint venture was actionable.104  
The court affirmed the trial court with regard to the count alleging 
deception and unfair actions toward the landowners.105 The court found that 
the Attorney General’s allegations fit with one of the enumerated actions 
within “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”106  
Judge Covey filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Judge Covey 
noted that the Appellants are lessees under the oil and gas leases and, 
therefore, are purchasers or consumers. Judge Covey agreed with 
Appellants, that no court ever interpreted the UTPCPL as authorizing a 
claim by or on behalf of a seller against a person who acquires something 
from the seller.107 Concluding the UTPCPL is not an antitrust statute, and 
that the Majority wrote its own causes of action in to the Law, Judge Covey 
concluded, “I find it unconscionable that as a direct result of the Majority’s 
decision, Appellants may be retroactively liable for engaging in conduct 
that was not considered to be violative of state law at the time such activities 
occurred.”108 
C. Pennsylvania Superior Court Cases 
1. Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2019).  
$ The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a preliminary 
injunction enjoining landowners from denying operator access 
to surface to construct a well pad to develop oil and gas from 
unitized properties.  
The Porters appealed an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor 
of Chevron that enjoined the Porters from “preventing access to and 
development of Chevron’s oil and gas rights.”109 Chevron was the assignee 
of a 2002 oil and gas lease (“Lease”) that granted the lessee exclusive rights 
to use the surface of the property in conjunction with oil and gas 
development “regardless of . . . the location of the wells.”110 The Lease 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 61. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 62 (J. Covey, concurring and dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 67. 
 109. Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411, 415 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). 
 110. Id. at 414. 
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allowed the lessee to unitize the leased property (“Porter Farm”). Chevron’s 
predecessor drilled multiple conventional wells on the Porter Farm. In 
2017, Chevron gave notice to the Porters that it intended to construct a well 
pad to develop multiple, unconventional wells to produce oil and gas from 
neighboring properties.111 The Porters filed a complaint asking for 
declaratory relief that the court declare Chevron may not use the surface of 
the Porter Farm to construct a well pad for use in the production of oil and 
gas from neighboring properties.112 Chevron filed preliminary objections to 
the complaint.  
While the preliminary objections were pending, Chevron notified the 
Porters that it would be entering the property to conduct environmental and 
geophysical investigations and that it would be “staking” the property in 
accordance with Pennsylvania’s One Call System.113 Chevron personnel 
arrived to find the gate to the property locked. After staking the property, 
one of the Porters removed the stakes and confronted Chevron personnel 
upon their return. He then stated to the Chevron personnel, “you best get 
off my property while the getting’s good.”114 Chevron considered the 
statement as a threat, left the property, and filed a motion for injunctive 
relief.115 After a hearing, the trial court granted Chevron’s motion and 
Porters appealed. 
The Porters raised three issues on appeal before the superior court:  
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the 
Porters to permit Chevron to conduct geotechnical testing on the 
surface of the Porter Farm where Chevron failed to provide any 
clear evidence that it would suffer immediate and irreparable 
harm if such testing was delayed? 
2. Where Chevron had never previously entered onto the surface 
of the Porter Farm to conduct any activities relative to the 
production of oil and gas from beneath adjoining lands, whether 
the trial court erred or abused its discretion by effectively 
changing that status quo by ordering the Porters to permit 
Chevron such access? 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 415. 
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3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused 
its discretion by effectively determining on the merits that 
Chevron has an absolute right to operate on the surface of the 
Porter Farm to produce oil and gas from beneath adjoining lands 
in order to support its grant of a mandatory preliminary 
injunction?116 
The superior court began by reciting the six factors that must be 
established to show a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction:  
(1) [R]elief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable 
harm that cannot be adequately compensated by money 
damages; (2) greater injury will occur from refusing to grant the 
injunction than from granting it; (3) the injunction will restore 
the parties to their status quo as it existed before the alleged 
wrongful conduct; (4) the petitioner is likely to prevail on the 
merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the 
offending activity; and (6) the public interest will not be harmed 
if the injunction is granted.117 
Porters’ first issue on appeal related to prevention of “immediate and 
irreparable harm.”118 They argued that Chevron failed to show that a delay 
would be more than an “inconvenience to Chevron.”119 The trial court 
disagreed, citing precedent that irreparable harm is deemed to exist where 
the rights involve interference with contractual rights in land.120 “In light of 
the unique and intrinsic value of land, interference with ... contractual rights 
to ownership of that land must be deemed irreparable harm.”121 The 
superior court agreed that the Porters’ actions “deprived Chevron of 
contractual rights in land pursuant to the 2002 lease, which in and of itself 
supports a finding of irreparable harm.”122  
Additionally, Chevron introduced evidence demonstrating that 
interference with Chevron’s access to perform the necessary testing “would 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 416 
 117. Id. (citing Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Com. Dep’t of Transp., 13 A.3d 925, 925 (Pa. 
2011)). 
 118. Id. at 416. 
 119. Id. at 417. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing New Eastwick Corp. v. Phila. Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d 766, 770 
(Pa. 1968)). 
 122. Id. 
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result in delay-related costs that would be impossible to quantify.”123 
Considering both the interference with Chevron’s contractual rights in land 
and the evidence that damages could not be accurately quantified, the 
superior court concluded that the record contained reasonable grounds for 
the trial court to find irreparable harm. 
Second, the Porters argued that preliminary injunctive relief should 
restore the status quo. Porters argued that Chevron, itself, had never entered 
the property prior to its recent entry to stake the property.124 The trial court 
disagreed, finding that “the status quo existing immediately prior to the 
wrongful conduct was that Chevron's predecessor, Atlas, had access to the 
Porters' land under the Lease as well as in practice. Chevron, as successor-
in-interest to Atlas under the Lease, is entitled to the same status.”125 
Because Atlas had access under the Lease, Porters’ interference with 
Chevron’s access disrupted the status quo. The superior court concluded 
that these were reasonable grounds for the trial court to find that the 
injunction was necessary to restore the status quo.126 
Finally, the Porters argued that the trial court improperly adjudicated the 
ultimate issue by determining Chevron could access the property “for 
whatever oil and production activities it wants” under the Lease. Id. 
Paragraph 10 of the lease (unitization clause) expressly states: 
Lessee the right at any time to consolidate the leased premises 
or any part thereof ... with other lands to form an oil and gas 
development unit or units ... for the purpose of drilling a 
well thereon, but the Lessee shall in no event be required to drill 
more than one well on any such unit or units.127 
The Porters argued that this clause only allowed Chevron to drill one well 
on the property. To the Porters, Chevron’s proposed use exceeded the scope 
of the lease.128 
First, the trial court disposed of the argument that the trial court’s order 
gave Chevron unfettered access.129 The injunction only allowed access “for 
the limited purposes of conducting necessary testing to obtain a DEP 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id.  
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permit.”130 Second, one of the factors weighed by the court when 
considering an injunction is whether the moving party is likely to prevail 
on the merits of the case—the movant must “establish a prima facie right 
to relief.131 As such, the trial court is required to analyze the underlying 
claims. Here, the terms of the lease gave rise to the action. The trial court 
was required to analyze and interpret the terms of the lease to determine 
whether Chevron was likely to prevail on the merits.132  
Applying principles of contract law to interpret the clause, the superior 
court agreed with the trial court’s determination that the Lease allowed the 
lessee to unitize the land for the purposes of drilling, but use of the 
indefinite article “a” did not restrict the lessee to only drilling one well.133 
Considering the remaining clause of that sentence, that “Lessee shall in no 
event be required to drill more than one well,” the trial court concluded that 
the context of the use of “a” well did not limit Chevron to drilling one well, 
it simply provided that Chevron was “not required to drill more than one 
well.”134 The superior court concluded that reasonable grounds existed for 
the trial to conclude Chevron was likely to succeed on the merits of the case 
and affirmed the grant of injunctive relief.135 
2. Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)  
$ The superior court held that an underground lateral was not a 
well “drilled on the leased premises” for purposes of a free gas 
clause 
Lessor Mitch brought an action in 2016 against lessee XTO Energy, Inc. 
(“XTO”) for breach of an oil and gas lease relating to alleged payments due 
under a free gas clause.136 Paragraph 4 of the lease addendum provided that: 
If any well(s) is (are) drilled on the lease premises and is (are) 
producing in paying quantities, the surface owner shall be 
entitled to receive a payment in lieu of free gas equal to 300,000 
cubic feet of gas multiplied by the average price received by 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. (citing Synthes USA Sales, LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
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 133. Id. at 418. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Lessee during the preceding year of production, provided the 
surface owner has his primary residence on the lease premises.137 
After the lease was executed, XTO built a well pad on adjacent property 
and unitized the multiple tracts, including the lease premises, under a 
pooling and unitization clause.138 A lateral well was drilled on the wellpad 
that passed under Mitch’s tract. Mitch and XTO brought motions for 
summary judgment after discovery and the Court of Common Pleas of 
Butler denied Mitch’s motion for summary judgment and granted XTO’s.139 
On appeal, the superior court noted that oil and gas leases are subject to 
the rules of contract interpretation, with the court’s goal being to 
interpreting the lease to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 
parties.140 Mitch argued that because a horizontal well passed through the 
leased tract, that well is “on the lease premises” for purposes of the lease 
addendum Paragraph 4. XTO argued that only a well on the surface of the 
property constituted a well “on the leased premises” for purposes of 
Paragraph 4.141   
The superior court found that Paragraph 4 was unambiguous.142 The 
court further concluded that the parties intended the term “on the leasehold 
premises” in Paragraph 4 to mean on the surface of the leasehold.143 “It is 
unreasonable to find that the parties intended to compensate a surface 
owner (who may be different from the lessor) where a well, situated on the 
surface of another’s property, has a horizontally-drilled portion that 
traverses the surface owner’s land thousands of feet beneath the surface.”144 
The use of the phrase “on the lease premises” to indicate the location of 
Mitch’s house in the second part of Paragraph 4 also supported this 
interpretation. The superior court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.145 
  
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 1137. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1138 (citing Porter v. Chevron Appalachia, LLC, 204 A.3d 411, (Pa. Super. Ct. 
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3. Julia v. Huntley, No. 632 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 311121 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 24, 2019). 
$ In a non-precedential decision, the superior court held that a 
deed reservation of “one half of any and all royalties and income 
or return from any oil or gas which may be produced on or from 
the premises hereby conveyed” reserved oil and gas rights 
beyond lease in effect at time of execution 
Julia was the successor to grantee of deed 1931 that reserved “one half 
of any and all royalties and income or return from any oil or gas which may 
be produced on or from the premises hereby conveyed.”146 In 2007 Julia 
executed an oil and gas lease, which was amended in 2011 to designate that 
half of the royalties be paid to the Huntleys, heirs of the grantors of the 
1931 deed.147 In 2015 Julia filed a quiet title action against the Huntleys, 
claiming title to all the oil and gas in and under his property. The Huntleys 
entered appearances and filed a motion for summary judgment which was 
granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County.148  
On appeal Julia argued that “the Huntley-Ames deed only reserved one 
half of the royalty payments from the oil and gas produced, not one-half of 
the oil and gas itself.”149 Julia further contended that the royalty payments 
were only reserved under the then-existing lease and that once the lease 
terminated the oil and gas rights reverted to his predecessor.150 
A reservation is the creation of a right or interest that did not previously 
exist; but if the thing or right exists at the time of conveyance, the deed’s 
language is treated as making an exception.151 The superior court concluded 
that the deed language was not ambiguous, noting that “[i]f Huntley had 
intended to limit the reservation clause to the lease with Northeastern, he 
could have included language reflecting that intent.”152 The court concluded 
that “[b]y intentionally placing the word ‘and’ between the two phrases 
‘one half of any and all royalties’ and ‘income or return from any oil or 
gas,’ Huntley meant to reference circumstances in addition to the lease, i.e., 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Julia v. Huntley, No. 632 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 311121, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 
2019). 
 147. Id. at *2. 
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royalties and oil and gas rights.”153 The superior court affirmed the 
judgment of the court of common pleas in favor of the Huntleys. 
D. Federal District Court Cases 
1. Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland Cty. v. CNX Gas Co., L.L.C., 380 F. 
Supp. 3d 464 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2019). 
$ Lessor failed to state breach of lease claim or conversion claim 
based on lessee’s prior waiver of post-production cost 
deductions, but stated sufficient claim that deductions were 
unreasonable to survive motion for summary judgment 
Lessor Municipal Authority of Westmoreland County (“MAWC”) and 
prior lessee, Dominion Exploration & Production, Inc., entered into an oil 
and gas lease in 2002 covering 2,255 acres in Westmoreland County, 
Pennsylvania.154 Lessee did not deduct post-production costs (“PPCs”). The 
lease was subsequently assigned to CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”), 
and Noble Energy, Inc. (“Noble”), and in 2011 they began deducting post-
production costs from royalty payments.155 MAWC filed a lawsuit in state 
court against CNX and Noble for breach of the lease and conversion. Noble 
removed the case to federal district court. The parties cross-moved for 
summary judgment. 
MAWC did not dispute that the lease expressly permitted the deduction 
of PPCs but argued that the lease was modified or that the right to deduct 
PPCs was “waived.”156 The district court concluded that MAWC was 
arguing that the lease was modified (as opposed to a waiver of the right to 
deduct PPCs from past royalty payments).157 However, there was 
insufficient evidence of a modification of the lease. There was no 
consideration for a modification of the lease, as required under 
Pennsylvania law.158 Nor did MAWC establish that it detrimentally relied 
on royalty payments without deduction of PPCs.159 Claims for equitable 
estoppel failed as well, due to MAWC’s failure to establish detrimental 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. (emphasis original). 
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reliance, and the district court dismissed MAWC’s claims for breach for 
deducting PPCs and equitable estoppel.160 
The district court refused to dismiss MAWC’s claims that CNX and 
Noble improperly deducted processing costs charged by a CNX affiliate for 
dry gas that did not require processing.161 Similarly, MAWC raised a triable 
issue as to whether Noble improperly deducted electricity costs that were 
not used to compress MAWC’s gas.162 
The district court dismissed MAWC’s remaining claims for conversion 
under the gist of the action doctrine. Under the gist of the action doctrine, 
a party cannot assert a tort claim against another party to a contract when 
the gravamen of such a claim is, in actuality, breach of contract.163 If the 
duty is created by the terms of the contract, then the claim sounds in breach 
of contract; if it derives from a party’s “broader social duty owed to all 
individuals,” the claim must be regarded as a tort.164 The district court found 
that the duty to pay royalties was purely contractual, hence MAWC’s 
conversion claims were improper.165 
2. Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 359 F. Supp. 3d 268 
(M.D. Pa. 2019). 
$ The district court denied motion to dismiss lessor’s claims for 
breach of lease’s unitization clause and royalty clause 
Oil and gas lessors, including the Chambers, brought an action against 
lessees alleging breaches of unitization clauses and royalty clauses in the 
leases.166 The unitization clause provided that: 
Lessor hereby grants to the Lessee the right at any time to 
consolidate the leased premises or any part thereof or strata 
therein with other lands to form [an] oil, gas, and/or coalbed 
methane gas development unit of not more than 640 acres, or 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. at 473 (“Under the theory of equitable estoppel applicable to contracts, a party’s 
conduct may modify an existing contract if: (1) the conduct induces another contracting party 
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 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 478 (citing Rahemtulla v. Hassam, 539 F. Supp. 2d 755, 777 (M.D. Pa. 2008)). 
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such larger unit as may be required by state law or regulation for 
the purpose of drilling a well thereon and Lessee shall be 
required to maintain a well density of at least 1 well per 160 
acres contained in such unit.167 
Lessees formed the Wootten North Unit containing 300 acres with one 
well. Lessors alleged that doing so violated the well density requirement in 
the clause of “1 well per 160 acres contained in such unit.”168 
The lessors also alleged that lessees violated the royalty clauses by 
deducting post-production costs from gas royalty payments.169 The leases 
contained language that was crossed out stating that the royalty would “less 
or net any post-production costs paid by Lessee to prepare for and/or deliver 
the oil, gas, and/or coalbed methane gas for sale[.]”170 Lessee Chesapeake 
Appalachia, L.L.C., allegedly violated the clause by deducting post-
production costs directly while lessee Equinor Onshore USA Properties, 
Inc. (“Equinor”), allegedly violated the clauses by selling gas at an 
artificially lower price to an affiliate.171  
Lessees argued that the well density requirement only applied to a 
“larger unit as may be required by state law or regulation” whereas lessors 
argued it applied to all wells. The district court found that the clause was 
patently ambiguous as to the proper interpretation. Lessees further argued 
that under the clause a well was only required for each 160 acres meaning 
that only a unit of 320 acres would require two wells. On the other hand, 
lessors argued that a unit with greater than 160 acres required at least two 
wells. The district court found in favor of lessors, reasoning that lessor’s 
interpretation “would yield strange results elsewhere in the contracts.”172 
The court denied the motion to dismiss. 
Regarding the claim that Equinor violated the royalty clause, the court 
noted that the claim that Equinor had sold gas at an artificially low price 
was based on a duty to market the gas.173 Lessee noted that the lease 
expressly disclaimed any implied covenants.174 Lessors argued that the 
lease created an express duty for lessee to “market” the gas, by describing 
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using the phrase “marketed and used off the premises.” The district court 
found that lessors’ argument was “reasonable” and that it would avoid “the 
absurd and unreasonable result that Equinor could sell gas to ENG for a 
nominal fee and still comply with the leases.”175 The district court 
acknowledged that the lease did not broad express duty to market language, 
but ultimately concluded that “I am not convinced at this early stage that 
the royalty clauses are unambiguous in the way Equinor suggests.”176 The 
district court denied the motion to dismiss the royalty claim against 
Equinor. 
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